South Street Seaport

From Protest to Armed Rebellion

During the financial crash of 1772, the British government investigated the East India Company and found that, with the combination of a recent war in India and famine in Bengal, the economic giant was on the edge of bankruptcy. It was promptly nationalized, but fifteen banks in Amsterdam failed. And needing to dump excess supply to regain its health, the royal company was now also permitted to export to Boston, Philadelphia, and New York without tax — although colonies still had to pay the import duty of 1767. New York’s rebels were aghast, fearing it might be the first of several new monopolies.

Meanwhile, the city’s mercantile elite found themselves in a now familiar bind: not wanting to legitimate Parliament’s decision and fearing its consequences for themselves, but also not wanting to cede leadership to the rebels by encouraging another boycott. New York’s governor, likewise, feared the street would erupt in protest and riot, as in the past two waves of legislation.

But the rebels sprang into action immediately, with a stream of public meetings and broadsides, now often signed “The Mohawks,” the moniker rebels in Boston later made famous. By October 1773, just five months after the Tea Act, Sears and McDougall stood before an enormous crowd at the waterfront, thanking New York’s maritime workforce for again helping to prevent royal agents from distributing taxed British goods — the very first protest in the colonies. Officials informed Gov. William Tryon that they would not distribute the import. Thousands gathered outside the Merchants Coffee House to burn the effigy of a sea captain who did. One month earlier, the commanding officer reported to Gen. Gage, now the appointed governor of Massachusetts, that New York’s rebels had managed to prevent all support from reaching the military in Boston’s harbor. Most of the twenty-eight riots that rocked New York during the Imperial Crisis would occur in these final years.

Thomas Malton, East India House, c. 1805

During the summer and fall of 1773, Sam Adams and others in Boston failed to advance the rebellion, John Adams writing finally: “Our credit is at stake… unless we [act], we shall be discarded by the sons of liberty in the other colonies.” But most of the colonies established Committees of Correspondence during this period, to organize protest if Britain suspended their legislatures — as they had with New York, during the last major wave of protest. And in December, after months of pressure from New York’s Sons, rebels in Boston staged their famous tea party, climbing aboard three ships dressed as Mohawks (carrying hatchets, their faces painted), and dumping £9,000 worth of the British good into the harbor.

Boston under military blockade during the crisis. The port had around 12,000 residents, just a little less than half of New York.

After hearing the news, Sears immediately circulated a letter calling on the Sons of Neptune to be ready when the next British ship came to New York. Tryon promised not to let any dock, but then left for England, with Colden sworn in as the acting governor again. On April 18, 1774, the Nancy arrived in Sandy Hook, carrying 698 chests of tea, double the amount rebels spoiled in Boston. It was refused, and the captain took refuge at the Merchants Coffee House. Three days later, the London anchored at Murray’s Wharf with eighteen boxes. That night hundreds gathered — “the greatest number… ever known in the city,” Rivington’s Gazette misreported — and threw it overboard. The next morning, another crowed marched on the Queen’s Head (Fraunces) Tavern, demanding the ferryman’s apology, and escorting both captains to the waterfront and back to London. As with the events of Golden Hill, the DeLancey faction now faced open rebellion from both rebel merchants and the waterfront laborers that radicals like Sears mobilized.

Illustration of John Lamb, the wine-dealer and Sons of Liberty radical, rousing New Yorkers over the Tea Act

London responded with the so-called Coercive or Intolerable Acts. Rebels mistakenly viewed the Quebec Act as one (the law enormously expanded the ex-French colony southward, granting its small population a Catholic bishop, and seeming to both nullify speculative land claims and to recreate the conditions of Pontiac’s Rebellion). But the most infamous of the four closed Boston’s harbor and dissolved “the democratic part” of the Massachusetts colonial government. The other two enabled governors to move trials to England and insisted that soldiers be quartered in “uninhabited houses, out-houses, barns, or other buildings” at colonial expense.

At the Queen’s Head, McDougall and Sears urged merchants to implement a third boycott, and resumed their proposal for a continental Congress (the idea Sam Adams would later famously advance). But while Oliver DeLancey spoke for the dominant political faction in the assembly — saying that he would “rather spend every shilling of [my] Fortune” than accept the Boston harbor shutdown — New York’s mercantile elite also fervently opposed the idea of another non-important agreement. McDougall, by now a famous radical, began referring to their erstwhile allies as “the old enemies of liberty,” and told Paul Revere to push the rebels in Boston on the continental congress idea at once. In July 1774, the “Committee of Fifty-One” (New York’s correspondence group) censured both McDougall and Sears. William Smith Jr., the future Loyalist, commented: “Strange that the Colony who had the first Intelligence of the Parliamentary Measures is behind all the rest.” But his pupil, the future rebel Gouverneur Morris, expressed the view of most elite merchants and landowners in New York, that reconciliation with Britain was the only sensible course.

By August, however, Boston had taken up the New York rebels’ call for a congress, and the DeLanceys consented to sending five (pro-boycott) delegates to Philadelphia for the meeting. McDougall unofficially hosted John and Sam Adams later that month, taking the Boston rebels to meet the “Liberty Printer” at Hanover Square and other leaders, before sending the congressional delegation off to meet the Fifty-One. The merchants’ opposition to boycott, or any larger action, disturbed them. But days later, New York’s delegates went to Philadelphia, John Jay leaving without fanfare, while large crowds escorted Isaac Low to New Jersey ferry at Paulus Hook and bid farewell to the rest with a procession from the Merchants Coffee House to a wharf near the Exchange, officiated by James Duane.

Rebels used handbills and broadsides, such as this one, to rally mobs

In New York, tensions reached a fever pitch over Boston. In September 1774, a few merchants began refusing to ship troops or military supplies, while carpenters refused to help build barracks for the British military that now occupied Boston. By January 1775, others shipped 1,000 lbs. of food and provisions to the blockaded port. Leaders in the DeLancey faction ejected radicals like McDougall and Sears from their deliberations at the Merchants, and Colden demanded business go on as usual. But there was now a rebel Congress, which imposed stiff penalties on those who failed to comply with an embargo on imports and exports, levied in October. Colonists who remained loyal to the British government were labelled enemies of the new rogue state. Thanks to James DeLancey, Jr., New York’s assembly narrowly refused to recognize Congress’ authority. In February, 1775, the legislature refused to appoint deputies for the second Continental Congress. But the rebels continued.

The DeLanceys still officially dominated the government. But the city moved overwhelmingly against them. From November 1774 to January 1775, James Rivington, the “Tory printer” at Hanover Square, published another famous series of essays in the Revolution, “A.W[estchester]. Farmer.” Writing under a pseudonym (itself significant), the Rev. Seabury argued that the rebels’ embargo on imports and exports to Britain would ruin New York’s small farmers, an eminently reasonable position. But the letters prompted a famous, hefty denunciation from an 18-year-old at King’s College (likewise unprecedented), a law student named Alexander Hamilton. In March, when Trinity’s Charles Inglis attempted to refute Thomas Paine’s Common Sense with a pamphlet warning against the dangers of war and independence, Sears led a mob and destroyed both the printed copies and everything in Rivington’s printshop. On the street, events moved as they did in print. When rebels on the waterfront attacked the merchants selling nails, pickaxes, shovels, billhooks, and spades to Gage’s army in Boston, the Council issued arrest-warrants for Sears and other radicals in the Sons of Liberty. But supporters came running to his aid from all over the city, rescuing the “King” at the Fly Market and parading him up Wall St. and Broad Way to the Liberty Pole. Robert Livingston Sr., head of the “rebel” faction in the assembly, expressed the common view among New York’s elite: “Every good man wishes that American may remain free… at the same time, I do not desire, we should be wholly independent of the mother country.” But the weight of public opinion fell hardest against the DeLancey faction in power. As before, this group of nascent Loyalists sent petitions to the King, the Lords, and the Commons, echoing the rebels’ complaints. But they still hoped for a middle-ground that would give the colonies greater independence without breaking from the Empire. In May 1775, James DeLancey Jr., the fantastically wealthy and influential head of the faction, sailed for England, hoping to negotiate such an order. But the events at Lexington and Concord forestalled that possibility. He never returned.

Isaac Low was elected chairman of the Committee of Fifty-One at Fraunces Tavern, and served previously in the colony’s Committee of Correspondence. He was a de facto governor in New York’s rebel congress, but turned Loyalist after the Declaration of Independence, like a number of rebels (and Sons of Liberty). He was released from jail by Washington but fled to England.

Tory Underground and Rebel Government

By the end of the decade-long Imperial Crisis, New York was still at a dangerous stalemate. On June 25, 1775, the same day Washington stopped in the city on his way to assume command of rebel forces in Massachusetts, Gov. Tryon returned from his visit to England. Both received a warm public reception. Like Colden in 1765, Tryon was soon forced to move onto the warship in the harbor for protection against the mob. But his “floating City Hall” persisted, a “Tory underground” which began plotting to kill or kidnap Washington that afternoon. And many other elites continued to urge moderation, prompting rebels in the other colonies to begin refering to New York as “Torytown.”

As the headquarters of British power in the colonies, New York naturally more Loyalists than any other port — merchants and landowners deeply enmeshed in the Empire’s market, as well as military officials and zealous Church of England ministers. Loyalists were united, powerful, and organized like nowhere else. Only the agricultural hinterland feeding the population in lower Manhattan was a greater hotbed: Brooklyn, Queens, and Staten Island, where small elite populations were even more dependent on imperial trade, benefited from rising land prices, and had more slaves to fall back on.

The English-born William Tryon married into wealth and served as governor of New York from 1771 to 1777. He established a strong defense in the city, but was an obvious target for rebels. Many radicals wanted to arrest him, but Gen. Washington refused. Tryon moved onto the British warships in the harbor in October 1775, and dissolved the colonial assembly, twice, when New Yorkers failed to vote out the rebels. The plot to kidnap Washington (and kill his top officers) was discovered and stopped. After the British invasion, Tryon became the Commander of forces on Long Island.

But just half of the colony supported the British. Upstate was mostly rebel territory, including Westchester and the Lower Hudson Valley, where fast-growing populations had repeatedly erupted in violence over aristocratic land ownership and declines in timber, flour, iron, and other mercantile sectors. Eastern Long Island, strongly connected to Connecticut’s small maritime ports, was pro-Independence, too. As was New York’s enormous working class — the Sons of Neptune who so worried moderate rebel leaders. And the radical merchants, sea captains, and craftsmen behind Sears and McDougall. With the establishment of a rebel Congress in 1774, local (often self-appointed) committees began springing up in New York all through 1775, too. In these para-governmental bodies, neighbors reported on neighbors, rooting out “crimes” and “conspiracies.”

This full-scale rebellion inevitably raised the prospect of armed revolt. That spring in 1775, Lord North’s stepbrother William Legge, the Earl of Dartmouth and foreign minister to the colonies, ordered all forts in North America secured or destroyed, to prevent rebels from seizing British arms. Months earlier, the King had forbid the colonies to import weapons. But in New York a large crowd had seized firearms and gunpowder shipped to a merchant from London. The customs official Andrew Elliott recovered the goods. But “Mohawks” posted a notice on the Merchants Coffee House, warning that his life would be in danger if they ever left town.

Many rebels therefore welcomed the battles at Lexington and Concord. Hearing the news on April 19, 1775, Isaac Sears and John Lamb went up and down the streets of New York, calling out recruits for war. They marched to the docks, unloaded two ships carrying provisions headed for Boston, and ordered the detention of any vessel with the same destination. That night, they led followers to City Hall, demanded the key to its armory, and then broke down its door when officials refused, seizing 500 muskets, cartridges, and bayonets. Later, even more spectacularly, they pilfered 1,200 lbs. of gunpowder from the magazine in the Out Ward, northeast of the main Barracks. The mobilization continued for days, with one Supreme Court justice noting that mobs “of negroes, boys, sailors, and pick-pockets” were still parading everywhere that weekend, “inviting all mankind to take up arms.” On Monday, the lieutenant governor, councilors, judges, and mayor gathered and quickly concluded — despite the five regiments Gage kept in the city — that “Magistratic Authority was gone.” Then came the message from rebels in Boston on Gage’s next destination: “The eyes of America are on New-York.”

Rebels immediately began seizing control of the militias and making weapons. While many New Yorkers feared the 64-gun man-0f-war in the harbor might render the city to ash, Tryon’s floating government did not want to destroy the homes of the loyal, or a port the British might need. So the rebels moved with relative impunity. In August, Sears proposed stealing the cannons in Fort George and sending them upriver to deny the British access to New England by choke-holding the Hudson at Kings Bridge, West Point, and Peekskill. In the dark of night, he and others somehow managed to drag a few up Broad Way (each weighing a ton), before the Asia left forth a broadside that blew through the roof of Fraunces Tavern and several houses in the area.

They established a Provincial Congress, too, and began repressing Loyalists — McDougall warning Jay that unless they were disarmed, “Tories” in Brooklyn and Staten Island would follow the lead of Queens, where Colden had organized a Loyalist militia and blocked elections to the Congress. Supporters from all three counties regularly visited Tryon’s floating government, using slaves, empathetic tavern-keepers, and others to spy on rebel activity. Fearing they would join the British when the invasion came, rebels fanned out across Queens, Brooklyn, and eastern Long Island, seizing weapons and imposing loyalty oaths. Many residents hid out in swamps and forests, barns and corn-fields, or boats in the Sound until the crackdown passed.

It was not until January 1776 that insurgents really gained control of New York. At that point, Washington ordered Charles Lee to take command of the city with a force of Continental troops. Lee forbade any provisioning of Tryon’s government, ordered any suspected Loyalist to be disarmed, and put Sears in charge of gathering oaths of allegiance. The “King” published the names of any who refused. Washington returned in mid-April to a city under full rebel occupation, rapidly building defenses for the anticipated invasion.

The rebels also put the city under martial law, with curfews and street patrols at night. One inhabitant complained: “We all live here like nuns shut up in a nunnery.” Like the old government, they struggled to quarter and feed their growing army, which constantly fell short on provisions and weapons. Officers went door to door at one point, seizing and purchasing firearms from locals. And the Continentals brought disease, too. One of Washington’s first actions was to establish a smallpox quarantine on Montresor’s island, owned by Britain’s chief engineer in the colonies, who soon became Gen. Howe’s aide-de-camp.

John C. McRae’s Pulling down the statue of George III by the "Sons of Freedom," at the Bowling Green, City of New York, July 1776 was the first major depiction of this iconic, viral moment of the Revolution. The engraving was based on the very first painting of this scene, done six years earlier by a refugee in the city named Johannes A. Oertel. Oertel appears to have been attracted to this subject because of the 1848 revolutions for democracy in England, France, Germany, and other parts of Europe, which brought him and many others to New York. But McRae, a Scottish publisher in the city who made his fortune depicting some of the earliest artwork depicting US history, eliminated the dejected Natives foregrounded in the little-viewed original, as well as the one Black figure. Over time the women disappeared, too.

During this period, which lasted more than a year, 20,000 residents left the city — all but a fifth of the population. The Loyalist storekeeper Frederick Rhinelander commented: “one would think the city almost evacuated. Women and children are scarcely to be seen in the streets.” The British warship in the harbor loomed as constant threat. “We are in daily expectation of having our city knocked down and burned,” one resident said that February. And rumor circulated that rebels would torch New York if they could not hold it. Everyone understood that a great battle was imminent. Sears and Lamb brought ‘traitors’ to the Liberty Pole “almost every day,” Robert Livingston Jr. claimed. Loyalists fled in droves, to England, Canada, and nearby havens like Long Island. Business, economic and political, came to a stop. Taverns overflowed with patrons and impassioned talk. By June, when the other warships began to arrive finally, the rebel Congress decamped to White Plains.

The British were slow to act, debating the need, the cost, and the logistics of a massive overseas invasion, with their recent dearth of allies and all the other concerns of the Empire — including their persistent debt crisis. While slowly gathering their forces in Boston harbor, London tried but failed to hire 20,000 Russian soldiers to help it “civilize” New York. But most New Yorkers supported the rebellion. Many had joined the 28,000 volunteers who gathered from across the colonies to stop the invasion of their city after the Battle of Bunker Hill in June 1775. And on July 9th, 1776, a large diverse crowd gathered at the Common to hear the Declaration of Independence read by Washington’s soldiers. That night a group of soldiers, mechanics, and seamen met at Bowling Green, outside the Fort. After working for hours in the dark heat, before a large crowd, they managed to topple the 4,000-lb. statue of King George the city had proudly erected just six years earlier. The shards were paraded through the streets, as petty criminals were in the day, and then carted and shipped to a foundry in Litchfield, Connecticut, where rebel women melted the lead into 42,088 bullets to fire at the Empire’s army.

NYC as the Fulcrum of Military Strategy

A Royal fleet bombards Charleston Harbor weeks before the invasion of New York. As the British naval historian Sam Willis notes: “The Revolution was rife with such fights, large and small, coastal and riverine, making it ‘without question, the largest and most significant naval war of the 18th century.’”

New York’s geographic features had made it the capital of British North America. Its deep harbor provided steady anchorage, relatively protected from storm, and the Hudson offered superlative access to Canada and the continental interior. Because the river also divided the mid-Atlantic and southern colonies from New England, the British considered New York a “post of infinite importance” in the words of the new commanding general William Howe. By controlling the Hudson, they believed that they could summon the many Loyalists they imagined were upstate, and compel the Haudenosaunee to support them by placing the Natives against the rebels. John Adams spoke for their rebellion, describing New York likewise as the “key to the whole continent.”

But those same features posed incredible danger in the short term, and immense challenges in the long term. Britain’s dominance rested on the strength of its navy, which policed the main routes of Atlantic commerce, cowing every other major imperial power. Its massive fleet could easily force the surrender of a small port like New York — or render it to ash. For that reason, most of the city fled between late 1775 and late 1776.

But the Hudson was a vast stretch of 140 miles to defend. And the British assumed they would be able to block the New England coast, too, and support troops moving up from New York and down from Canada. This fascination with the river — which lasted even after the French joined the war — may have been a principal factor in their defeat. It was, perhaps just as consequentially, a purely military strategy, too. The British believed, like the Loyalists who misinformed them, that rebels were only a loud minority. True enough: historians now estimate they commanded no more than 40 percent of the population. But that was a sizeable figure. And the British soon learned that New York’s value quickly disappeared once the vast areas surrounding it became liabilities to defend, not resources to draw from.

Rebels understood how difficult it would be to defend New York (an archipelago) without a navy. Preparing for invasion between February and July in 1776, Lord Stirling ordered “all” White and Black men in the area to construct forts and batteries at natural chokepoints around the harbor — on Governors Island, in Red Hook and Brooklyn Heights, along the Narrows and in Paulus Hook, New Jersey, in upper Manhattan — and well up the Hudson, from Fort Washington to Fort Constitution.

A Fleet Bringing Death: The British Invasion

Map of rebel fortifications, published in Henry P. Johnston’s The Campaign of 1776 around New York and Brooklyn (1878).

But in late June, the British fleet began to arrive. Landing first on Staten Island, a Loyalist stronghold with hills that provided an ideal view of the harbor, they staged the invasion. By the end of July, there were no longer dozens of warships but over 100 in the harbor. By late August, the count reached 427, carrying 30,000 British soldiers (a great number “Hessian” recruits from the Germanic states). It was the largest amphibious expeditionary force since the invasion of ancient Troy, and would remain such until D-Day in World War II. Looking out from the military hospital near Whitehall, private Daniel McCurtin quivered: “I thought all London was afloat.” A British Vice Admiral boasted the masts were ‘‘as thick as trees in a forest,’’ a “Force so formidable [it] would make the [next greatest] power in Europe tremble.’’ And indeed that was the point: England desperately wanted to crush the rebellion, before France joined.

William Elliott, Lord Rodney's flagship Formidable breaking through the French line at the Battle of the Saintes, c. 1784-87. This contemporary painting, from a later war, gives perhaps the greatest visual impression of what New York’s harbor looked like during the famous “Revolutionary Summer of ‘76.”

New York was “a compleat garrison” now. But large crowds gathered to welcome the British when they arrived, including 2,000 Loyalist soldiers, organized and financed by Oliver DeLancey, aide-de-camp to (his in-law) Gen. Gage. Smiths, carpenters, drivers, farmers, cartmen, tavern-keepers, and merchants lined up to offer provisions and services, too. Men like Inglis and Tryon wanted to seize rebel property and capture their leaders immediately. But the Howes understood their primary mission would be to win hearts and minds. That summer they offered pardons to anyone who pledged fealty. This difference in approach would soon begin to fester, significantly undermining the counterinsurgency.

Admiral Richard Howe (right) meets with Benjamin Franklin, John Adams, and Edward Rutledge at the Conference House in Tottenville, Staten Island, September 1776. Howe offered to end the conflict peacefully if the colonies returned to British control. The rebels declined.

A City & Nation Still Divided

Many of the 20,000 who fled New York remained in the surrounding region until after the war, hoping to maintain connections with family, trading partners, and friends. Partisans on both sides of the Atlantic saw New York as the cradle of Loyalism, since no other colony had so many royal functionaries, churchmen, landowners, and merchants. But the city had also rivalled, and often exceeded, Boston and Philadelphia in terms of rebelliousness during the Imperial Crisis. Its working-class was a hotbed of “radical republicanism,” advocating unicameralism, limited executive power, secret ballots, universal White male suffrage, religious liberty, and even abolition. By 1776, nearly 60 percent of the entire colony (160,000 Whites) backed independence. Only 16,000 took up arms for the British, against 36,000 supporting the rebels.

These numbers meant, however, that New York remained divided. The wider metropolitan area saw routine acts of violence before the Occupation and during it, pitting neighbor against neighbor, even in bastions of Loyalism like Staten Island, Queens, Brooklyn. More divided regions like Westchester (including the Bronx), eastern New Jersey, and Long Island also witnessed continual bouts of vigilantism — not least because an even greater number of New Yorkers refused to pick a side. In this respect, the colony represented well the divisions of the “country” at large, with historians estimating that 40 percent of the population remained neutral or undecided. Another 20 percent backed the existing government. In the lower Hudson valley, a quarter may have been Loyalist. In New Jersey, perhaps a third.

While remaining a Loyalist hotbed, Staten Island, where the British staged the invasion of 1776, also saw civil violence throughout the war, like most of the region.

Revolutionary Summer: The Battle for New York

Henry Alexander Ogden, The Retreat from Long Island (1897), New York Public Library. In this rare depiction of Washington’s escape from Brooklyn, missing are the many enslaved mariners whose skill navigating the waters, under heavy cover of fog, enabled the Revolution to survive.

The Battle for New York was the largest and most important fight of the war, ensuring the very survival of the rebellion. But the forces assembled by London nearly crushed the Revolution at the start. For two days, the superior army chased George Washington’s soldiers across King’s County, finally pinning them against the water in Brooklyn Heights. From their entrenchment, the Continentals saw the British Navy anchored nearby. At any moment, those ships could end the Revolution. Yet the rebels managed to escape, miraculously. Under cover of darkness, skilled White and Black seamen rowed thousands of colonials to safety across the storm-battered East River; only a mile wide, and full of challenges to any mariner. From there, Howe pushed Washington’s troops up the island and the Hudson. Loyalists under James DeLancey of Westchester squared off with rebels at the major supply depot in White Plains.

The Battle for New York was relatively short-lived, three months in all. But it was incredibly far-reaching. Washington had just 19,000 troops, spread over sixteen miles, thinly equipped amateurs, normally under politically appointed officers. Soldiers claimed to hear Washington rage: “Are these the men with whom I am to defend America?” The British might have easily crushed them. Gen. Henry Clinton wanted to stop them in Manhattan, but Gen. Howe wanted to preserve the city as a winter headquarters. Howe hesitated ordering his soldiers to attack entrenched rebel positions, fearing a repeat of the bloody Battle of Bunker Hill. He also wanted to show mercy — hoping to win at low cost, and personally knowing and liking many Americans. Some historians believe that Howe failed to snuff out the Revolution despite having the chance to do so.

Still, Howe’s victories in New York were decisive. Humiliated, the Continental Army shrank from desertions, a perennial issue at harvest time. Washington, considering the prospects of a bleak winter, lamented: “The game is pretty near up.” The British saw the war as over, too, its press claiming “vast numbers” of loyal recruits.

But the rebels turned it around with a series of victories in western New Jersey, including the surprise attack on the Hessian garrison at Trenton, New Jersey, on Christmas night (better remembered as the famous “crossing of the Delaware” river, narrow but thick with ice). Grenville’s fears of 1763 were realized then: defending so large and populous a colony, from so far away, would be very difficult.

But the victory in New York was similarly pyrrhic. It had a disastrous effect on the region, which reverberated across the seven long years that followed. The reestablishment of that city as the military command of British North America would continually demonstrate the importance of nature and geography, and both “hard” and “soft” power. It would also point up the historical contingency of the war’s outcome, and New York’s central role in that development.

  • On the Battle for New York, see Barnet Schecter, The Battle for New York: The City at the Heart of the American Revolution (New York, 2002); David Hackett Fischer, Washington’s Crossing (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002); David McCullough, 1776 (New York, 2005); Bruce Bliven, Under the Guns: New York, 1775-76 (Harper and Row, 1972); Henry P. Johnson, The Campaign of 1776 around New York and Brooklyn (Long Island Historical Society, 1878), https://www.gutenberg.org/files/21990/21990-h/21990-h.htm; Patrick K. O’Donnell, The Indispensables: The Diverse Soldier-Mariners Who Shaped the Country, Formed the Navy, and Rowed Washington Across the Delaware (Atlantic Monthly Press, 2021); Patrick O’Donnell, Washington’s Immortals: The Untold Story of an Elite Regiment Who Changed the Course of the Revolution (Grove Press, 2017).

    On military mobilization in 1775-1776, see Charles Royster, A Revolutionary People at War: the Continental Army and American Character, 1775-1783 (Omohundro Institute for Early American History and Culture, 1979); James Kirby Martin and Mark Edward Lender, “A Respectable Army”: the Military Origins of the Republic (Wiley-Blackwell, 2015).

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